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1.  introduction 
The problem of choosing the optimal structure of the parliament, in particular 
the resolution of the issue of the number of its chambers, the procedure of their 
formation and competence, belongs to the category of those that accompany 
the theory and practice of state building since the emergence of the first 
parliamentary institutions and the concept on the representative government. 
It has not lost its relevance at the present time. Moreover, at the turn of the 
millennium the interest of researchers to the problem of bicameralism received 
a new impetus due to the latest attempts of constitutional reform of the upper 
chambers in a number of leading countries of Western democracy. Quite often 
one can even find the statement that bicameralism is a “key characteristic of 
liberal constitutionalism” (e.g., One Text Initiative, 2011, p. 11). Surely, since 
2014 the new stage of economic and political dialogue in the framework of EU 
Eastern Partnership has brought to Ukrainian political spectrum severe risks of 
frustration and skepticism about European integration in case of failure to adopt 
relevant shapes of societal development (Tsybulenko & Parkhomenko, 2016; 
Kerikmäe & Chochia, 2016). 
The authors of this article continue the scientific discourse in the sphere of 
bicameralism, contributing to the list of arguments that exist in modern legal 
literature in favor of Ukraine’s transition to bicameralism. In the first section of 
this paper the authors have made an attempt to argue the thesis about the way 
how bicameralism may contribute to further diversification of state power, while 
in the second section they substantiate the positive significance of the upper 
chamber to strengthen the stability of the government in terms of a consensual, 
pluralistic democracy and semi-presidential government.
2. The problem of bicameralism in modern scientific discourse 
The literature published in recent decades concerning the issues of bicameralism 
and the status of the upper chambers of parliaments is very extensive (see 
Tsebelis & Money, 1997; Mughan & Patterson, 1999; Joyal, 2003; Smith, 2003; 
Russell, 2000; Luther, Passaglia & Tarchi, 2006). A special issue of the Journal 
of Legislative Studies deserves particular attention in this regard. This issue 
covered key political and legal aspects of modern bicameralism. All this confirms 
the validity of the statement that “the bicameralism persists in the modern 
world and causes unflagging interest both among theorists and practitioners, 
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engendering particularly acute disputes during the preparation of the drafts of 
new constitutions or amendments to existing basic laws” (Avtonomov, 2013).
2.1 Bicameralism as the theme of political discussions in ukraine  
 in terms of European integration
In this context, Ukraine is not an exception, as there is a discussion in Ukraine 
on the need for a transition to bicameralism during the whole period of 
independence, at all stages of the new constitutional process. It is sufficient to 
recall that the bicameral structure of the parliament was envisaged by the first 
drafts of the new Constitution of Ukraine. In particular, in accordance with the 
draft of the Constitution of Ukraine, as worded on July 1, 1992, the parliament, 
which was suggested to be called the National Assembly of Ukraine, was to 
consist of two chambers: the Council of MPs and the Council of Ambassadors. 
The next draft of the new Constitution of Ukraine, as worded on May 27, 1993, 
also provided for the creation of a bicameral parliament; this time it was offered 
to be called the All-People’s Council of Ukraine, and the chambers—the State 
Rada and Rada of Territories. Bicameralism was also envisaged in the draft 
of the Constitution of Ukraine dated February 24, 1996, where the return to 
the name “National Assembly of Ukraine” was announced, but with slightly 
different names of the chambers—this time they were offered to be called the 
Chamber of MPs and the Senate (Holovaty, 1997).
The adoption of the current Constitution, dated June 28, 1996, did not even stop 
the discussion on the optimal structure of the Ukrainian parliament (Constitution 
of Ukraine, 1996). In the future, the idea of a bicameral parliament, combining 
the interests of the people’s representation with the representation of the 
interests of the regions, was embodied in the draft of the Law of Ukraine ‘On 
Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine’, which was submitted for public 
discussion by the Decree of the President of Ukraine dated March 6, 2003. This 
draft provided for the creation of a bicameral parliament, which was to consist 
of the National Assembly and the Chamber of Regions. A similar approach 
was later provided for by the draft of the “people’s” Constitution of Viktor 
Yushchenko in 2009, but with different names for the chambers, as suggested 
by the draft dated February 24, 1996, they were offered to be called the Chamber 
of MPs and the Senate.
However, we can trace an interesting detail: despite the known “public inquiry” 
for parliamentary bicameralism in Ukraine, the final decision is always in favor 
of monocameralism. This situation was not affected even by the results of 
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participants expressed their support for the transition to a bicameral structure of 
the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Let us recall that 24,244,220 citizens of Ukraine, 
which constituted 81.68% of the total number of participants in the referendum, 
responded positively to the question: “Do you support the need to form a 
bicameral parliament in Ukraine, where one of the chambers would represent 
the interests of the regions of Ukraine and facilitate their implementation, and 
the introduction of appropriate amendments in the Constitution of Ukraine and 
electoral legislation?”
At the same time, the draft of the Concept of Amendments to the Constitution of 
Ukraine, which was taken as a basis by the Decision No. 14 of the Constitutional 
Assembly dated June 21, 2013, ignored the problem of bicameralism. There was 
no proper place for this problem in the work of the Constitutional Commission.
This attitude of the Ukrainian political elite to the problem of bicameralism 
clearly dissonances with European tendencies, where the problem of not 
only bicameralism at the domestic level but “bicameral Europe” is seriously 
discussed (see Senates and representation of local authorities, 2001). In this 
regard, it should be noted that the research of 2014 focused on the future role 
and institutional positioning of the European Committee of the Regions (CoR), 
five scenarios of the future provided forecasts of the evolution of the institutional 
and political role of the CoR, related powers and relations with other institutions 
and concerned parties of the European Union. The first and fifth scenarios in the 
context of the object of our research are of the greatest interest. The first—which 
is the scenario of a dynamic status quo—involves strengthening the consultative 
and political powers of the CoR without changing the EU Treaty, improving the 
quality and influence of its opinion on the legislative process. The fifth scenario 
describes the situation when the CoR would act as the third legislative chamber 
(along with the EU Council and the European Parliament) representing local 
and regional authorities. This scenario will require extensive revision of the EU 
Treaty in regard to creation of a strong and independent third chamber—the 
European Senate, which can influence the EU policies, guarantee institutional 
stability and represent the diversity of European collective components that the 
other two legislative chambers can not represent (Smith, 2003). The creation of 
the second chamber of the parliament, in the aspect of the European integration 
plans of Ukraine, would certainly be consonant with the tendencies of “bicameral 
Europe”.
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2.2 Bicameralism: pro and contra
Addressing the scientific discourse on the problem of bicameralism, one should 
note the gradual transition of scientific research from a speculative, formal and 
legal, its examination in the context of the system and structural organization of 
the state apparatus, certain configuration of state power at its highest, political 
level, to the institutionalism based on generalization and analysis of significant 
empirical material, gained from the practice of parliamentary institutions of 
various world states (see Tsebelis & Rash, 1995; Lijphart, 1984; Heller, 1997).
At the same time, the need to implement a bicameral structure of the parliament 
is still controversial.
Proponents of bicameralism believe that the bicameral structure of the 
parliament has a number of advantages over the unicameral structure, since, 
in particular, it implies a more complete consideration of the interests of 
various social, economic, cultural groups or geographical units through the 
expansion of representation of sub-national authorities; creation of prerequisites 
for representation of regional interests at the national level, etc. The positive 
quality of the bicameralism is often indicated by the presence of restraining 
mechanisms (when the upper chamber becomes a sort of deterrent to the lower 
one), which provides a more balanced legislative process, where the chambers 
act as independent expert institutions, and as a result, the impossibility of 
making unconsidered legislative decisions. It is also noted that bicameralism 
in terms of a pluralistic democracy ensures balancing of the multi-polar forces 
in the parliament, since the political evaluation of the activities of one chamber 
is supplemented by a political comparative assessment from the position of 
another chamber.
Sometimes, among the advantages of bicameralism, it is noted that it can lead to 
some optimization of the activity of the chambers by raising the professional level 
of the deputy corps and reducing the number of their deputies, which facilitates 
constructive discussion of issues and making balanced decisions, as well as to 
the increase in the publicity of the legislative process and other parliamentary 
procedures. It is believed that the bicameral system contributes to the improvement 
of legislative work due to the fact that the duties of the upper chamber include a 
thorough check of often hasty decisions of the lower chamber, playing the role of 
a “filter” in the legislative process. It is often emphasized that bicameralism, in the 
context of constitutional design, contributes to the balance in the state mechanism 
between the legislative power, the head of state and the executive power (e.g., 
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The main advantages of the bicameral system according to J. Mastlas and L. 
Grange (1987) in the systematized form are as follows: both chambers mutually 
restrain each other in the sphere of power; the bicameral parliament more 
effectively restrains the executive power; the bicameral parliament provides for 
a broader representation of electorate, especially in multinational countries; the 
presence of the second chamber ensures a more thorough study of draft laws; 
the second chamber acts as a guarantor of the Constitution, since the terms of 
passing the controversial bills are extended, which gives additional time for 
consideration of the bill and its public discussion (Mastlas & Grange, 1987).
It is also important that bicameralism ensures the impossibility of introducing 
unexpected and drastic changes in the implementation of the state policy after 
subsequent elections, since elections of chambers are carried out in different 
terms and according to different electoral systems. This feature of the bicameral 
system has been pointed out by the classical authors of constitutionalism. 
“The separation of the legislative corps,” Bentham noted, “greatly hinders the 
reforms with any composition of the chambers [...] The state ship, reinforced by 
two anchors, acquires such a resistance force that it could not ever achieve by 
any other means” (Bentham, 1816). The quality of bicameralism seems rather 
controversial for Ukraine, which at the present stage requires a lot of socio-
economic, political and legal reforms, but in the long-term perspective, when 
stabilization and consolidation of the obtained results is required, it certainly 
can play its positive role.
In turn, the idea of the bicameral parliament raises anxiety and concern on the 
part of many domestic government experts who believe that the appearance 
of the second chamber can be an additional incentive for the federalization of 
Ukraine, and can threaten the integrity and inviolability of its territory. There 
is also a fear that bicameralism can significantly complicate and, as a result, 
slow down the legislative process due to significant differences between the 
chambers; consequently, a rapid response to changes in the socio-political and 
socio-economic life of the country will become impossible. Some authors argue 
that the emergence of the second chamber can create an artificial confrontation 
between the chambers and political demarcation, lead to the emergence of 
political central lines “the chamber of the parliament—the government”, “the 
chamber of the parliament—the head of the state” and, as a consequence, 
threatens to further aggravate contradictions between the supreme agencies of 
the state, which can be accompanied by a permanent struggle between them for 
the dominant position in determining the beginnings of domestic and foreign 
policy, or weaken the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and make it dependent on the 
executive authorities (Fisun, 2008; Zhuravsky, 2001; Slovska, 2013).
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It should be noted that among foreign researchers there are many critics of the 
bicameral parliament. Thus, in the above-mentioned work, Mastlas and Grange 
(1987) point out the following disadvantages of bicameralism: the second 
chamber often acts as a brake of democracy, especially when its members 
are not elected or are elected through indirect elections; the second chamber 
contributes to conservatism in politics, since it supports existing constitutional 
arrangements and sometimes reflects the interests of only the ruling elite; the 
bicameral parliament may restrict access to the policy definition process, since 
the final development of legislative acts is in the hands of the joint committees. 
However, supporters of bicameralism argue that the bicameral legislature is the 
guarantor of better legislation, greater representativeness and greater pluralism 
of opinions (Mastlas & Grange, 1987).
“The strength of bicameralism,” Lijphart (1999) reasonably points out, “depends 
on two criteria: the symmetry and incongruence of the two houses of the 
legislature”. However, two chambers are considered to be symmetrical, if they 
are equally sovereign and both are elected directly by voters, through universal, 
equal and direct elections, and therefore both have full democratic legitimacy. 
At the same time, two chambers of the parliament are incompatible if they differ 
significantly in their composition. In turn, B. Loomis and H. Manning rightly 
point out that “by design, bicameral legislatures often produce tensions between 
lower chambers, with their direct, localized ties that often link members and 
constituents, and upper chambers by varying sizes of constituencies and electoral 
mechanisms” (Loomis & Manning, 2014). In our opinion, bicameralism in 
Ukraine is justified only in the “strong” version; otherwise the second chamber 
will initially have a rudimentary nature, which will only discredit the very idea 
of bicameralism. Meanwhile, one must be prepared for the fact that relations 
between the chambers, especially in the first years after the implementation of 
bicameralism, will not be easy: according to the experience of many countries 
in the world, the effective functioning of the bicameral parliament and the 
establishment of a constructive dialogue between chambers requires time and 
the accumulation of positive law-enforcement practice.
Quite common is the thesis that the second chamber has the right to exist 
only in a federal state, where it represents the interests of the subjects of the 
federation (e.g., see Svyatotsky & Chusenko, 1998; Dhami & al-Nowaihi, 2007; 
Bordenyuk, 2011; Hickey, 2013). The famous French political scholar Marcel 
Prelo believed it expedient to have the second chamber of the parliament (Prelot, 
1955). Naturally, any reference about federalization is met with apprehension, 
and sometimes even a strong protest in today’s Ukraine, which is facing serious 
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phenomena, including bicameralism. In this regard, it should be specially 
emphasized that bicameralism itself does not threaten unitarism: bicameral 
parliaments are inherent not only in the federal but also in the unitary states; 
only in Europe there is a dozen of them. Another thing is that the federal form of 
the state structure presupposes the existence of the second chamber as an agency 
for representing the interests of the subjects of the federation. In other words, 
the connection here is of an opposite nature: the federal form itself determines 
the bicameralism of the national parliament, but bicameralism itself does not 
require federalization at all.
In general, the upper chambers are often characterized as “embodying a 
particular measure of wisdom, balance and expertise” (Gélard, 2006). The high 
authority of the senators indeed has a direct positive impact on the quality of 
the debates and consultations in the work of the upper chamber, as a result of 
which the political weight of the chamber itself and the parliament on the whole 
is increased. It seems that the Ukrainian parliament has often lack of this.
Throughout the 20th century, the number of bicameral parliaments has steadily 
declined, convincingly confirming the position of skeptics of the bicameralism. 
Thus, the periodic analytical reports of the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the 
results of expert studies recorded a steady decline in the bicameralism, especially 
in unitary states. So, in 1961 the share of bicameral parliaments was 59%, in 
1976 it was 46%, in 1986—34% and in 1996—33% (according to IPU, 1962; 
Herman & Mendel, 1976; IPU, 1986; Coakley & Laver, 1997). This tendency 
was universally recognized and was observed not only at the national, but also 
at the sub-national level (except for Australia and the USA) (Massicotte, 2001).
However, after the collapse of the “communist camp” and the overthrow of 
authoritarian regimes in other countries, many of the successor countries returned 
to the bicameralism, both in the Philippines (1987), Poland (1989), Romania 
(1990) and Ethiopia (1995). In the early 2000s, the situation changed even more 
radically and the number of the bicameral parliaments began to increase rapidly 
both in gross and in percentage terms. Between 1996 and 2012, there were at 
least 28 new second chambers, 19 of them in Africa and the Middle East, 4 in 
Asia and 5 in Europe and on the territory of the former USSR. During the same 
period, only 9 countries moved in the opposite direction—to the unicameralism 
(Coakley, 2012).
While in the 1970s the bicameral legislature had about 45 countries around 
the world, by now this indicator has risen to almost 80 countries (Forum of the 
World’s Senates, 2000). In April 2014, 79 bicameral systems (41.15%) and 113 
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unicameral systems were registered in the database of the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union. Of course, not all states that gave preference to bicameralism can serve 
as a model of democracy, especially in case of Africa and the Middle East, but 
it is more important for Ukraine than for others, in the light of its pro-European 
aspirations. 
The European Union itself is considered to be a unique platform for testing 
all the existing legislative models of liberal democracies. In countries that 
the IPU considers to be in the European region, the ratio is approximately the 
same: 17 countries with a bicameral system (35.42%) and 31 with a single 
chamber (Drexhage, 2015). Among the 28 EU Member States, 13 of them, that 
is almost half, have chosen bicameralism. Yet, accession to the EU has raised 
a number of questions on the constitutional status of national parliaments. For 
example, in Estonia the delegation of legislative drafting and decision-making 
from parliament to government representing the state at supranational level 
was highly debated and resulted in the subsequent amendments to the statute 
(Kerikmäe, 2016).
Herewith it is important to note that among the reasons underlying this process, 
it is increasingly indicated that “without necessarily seeking to embrace 
federalism, many of the world’s nations are pursuing decentralization policies 
which justify an independent representation at central level, and bicameralism 
is the only system appropriate for such contexts”. As the Venice Commission 
report of 2006 states, the second chambers are “necessary, and will become 
increasingly so, in federal states and ones that are constitutionally regionalized 
or heavily decentralized, where second chambers represent geographical areas 
whereas first chambers represent peoples” (Gélard, 2006). Therefore, in the 
conditions of the constitutional reform being carried out in Ukraine regarding the 
decentralization of power, the issue of the transition to the bicameral parliament 
is not only appropriate, but even necessary.
M. Russell in her article ‘What are second chambers for?’ singled out four 
factors that justified the existence of the second chambers: (1) the representation 
of different interests, (2) the independence from the executive, (3) the acting as 
a veto-player and (4) the performance of different parliamentary duties (Russell, 
2001). This argument is taken as the basis for the arguments of many other 
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3. advantages of bicameralism: several additional arguments  
for ukraine 
Being consistent supporters of bicameralism of the Ukrainian parliament, we 
consider it necessary to make several additional arguments. Recently, there are 
many scientific articles, the authors of which pay particular attention to the 
analysis of bicameralism from the point of view of public choice and rational 
actor of politics analysis, within the framework of concepts of deliberative and 
participatory democracy (see Riker, 1992; Brennan & Hamlin, 1992; Bradbury 
& Crain, 2002; Congleton, 2003; Goot, 1999; Aroney, 2008). The results of 
the studies of the above-mentioned authors provide grounds for making 
additional arguments in favor of bicameralism. All of them, to one degree or 
another, concern two important aspects: the diversification of power and the 
strengthening of the “survivability” of the government.
3.1 Bicameralism as the way to diversify the power
Let us start with the diversification of power (in English, a diversified system of 
governance). Most modern constitutionalists agree that unicameral parliament 
and the combination of the presidency with the executive power in a centrally 
controlled country are a real problem for democratic governance. Therefore, 
at the present time, the theme of decentralization in its various manifestations 
like deconcentration, delegation, devolution, privatization, is the red thread of 
reforms in the sphere of the organization of public power. However, the essence 
of all these processes lies in the dispersal of power, eliminating the possibility 
of concentrating excessive power in one hand, ensuring the competitiveness 
of power decisions. In this aspect, bicameralism can also be viewed as a 
manifestation of the diversification of the legislative power. Naturally, such a 
diversification can only take place when the upper chamber has real opportunities 
to influence the process of drafting and adopting legislative acts, to participate in 
determining the significant elements of their form and content.
Many modern political scholars and constitutionalists, who consider the 
bicameralism as a means of a democratic parliamentary system, distinguish 
between two essential aspects: a different institutional basis and different 
“political make-up” (Tsebelis & Rash, 1995). All this involves institutionalized 
groups with specific interests in the work of the legislative agency that are very 
important for a society. In particular, Arend Lijphart, discussing the issue of 
majority and consensus democracy, sees the special meaning and significance 
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of bicameralism for pluralistic societies (harshly divided according to 
religious, ideological, linguistic or racial characteristics, which forms sub-
communities separated from each other), for which the model of consensus 
democracy matches (see Lijphart, 1984). Indeed, bicameralism refers to 
those constructive features of legislative institutions that make possible the 
processes of representative government, taking into account the diversity of 
voters’ opinions to the maximum.
The idea of a bicameral structure of the parliament is based on the recognition 
of the fact that the society is heterogeneous in its composition with a large 
number of different interests. Modern democracies try to take this recognition 
into account by creating different forms of making political decisions. However, 
it is impossible to simultaneously consider the diverse interests of all groups and 
individuals. It is not easy to determine which of the many interests should be 
institutionalized, and in which form. There were attempts to make progress in 
the framework of bicameral parliamentarism in terms of the legislative agencies, 
to which the idea of bicameral parliaments primarily belongs.
In case there is a stable majority in the lower chamber, there is always a threat 
of trampling down the interests of those social groups and layers whose interests 
are represented by the parties that are in the opposition. Such parliamentary 
majoritarianism, with all its formal democracy, reduces the legitimacy of 
the legislative agency, deprives it of support from a significant part of the 
population that feels “irrelevancy” for the authorities, leads to the spread of 
protest sentiments, and in its extreme manifestations can lead to open civil 
confrontation. In these conditions, the appearance of the second, upper chamber 
provides the parliament “double legitimacy” and, in turn, strengthens its support 
among the bulk of the electorate.
On the other hand, the presence of the upper chamber broadens the electoral basis 
of the parliament, allows the parties that did not pass into the lower chamber, 
or which were in a minority, to take revenge during the elections to the upper 
chamber. In turn, the broader the electoral base of the current parliament is, the 
higher is its viability and stability, and the more significant is its role in the life 
of the state and society.
Besides, the broad electoral basis of the bicameral parliament makes it possible 
(with the appropriate electoral system) to more clearly grasp and reflect the 
opinion of the regional elites and, therefore, to counteract separatism by solving 
the accumulated problems within the legislation. This quality of bicameralism 
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It should be noted that all the second chambers of parliaments of the Member 
States of the European Union, with the exception of the Irish Senate and the House 
of Lords of the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, the Italian Senate, are 
agencies of representation of sub-national territorial entities (provinces, regions, 
departments, municipalities, etc.). Regarding some of them, as in France and 
Spain, this role of territorial representation is specifically enshrined in the text of 
the Constitution. For example, the Senate of France is defined by the Constitution 
of 1958 as a representation of the territorial communities of the Republic (la 
représentation des collectivités territoriales de la République)(Art. 24). The 
senators are elected by the electoral collegiates in each department, notably 
the design of the electoral system leads to a clearly excessive representation of 
rural areas, which is the reason why the French Senate is sometimes called the 
Chambre d’Agriculture, or the Agricultural Chamber. Taking into account the 
fact that the rural population of Ukraine is about 30%, the French experience of 
bicameralism seems to be very exhortative.
In this regard, it is noteworthy that only senates of Italy, Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Spain among the upper chambers of the parliaments of the Member 
States of the European Union, are elected (partially) by direct elections; all the 
others are formed indirectly. This is a bright indication that the ability of the 
upper chambers of parliaments to represent the interests of the regions is not 
directly dependent on the procedure of their formation. Moreover, in case of 
indirect formation, the upper chamber is less susceptible to the influence from 
the ruling parties and, as a consequence, to the impact from the government.
It is important to note that representation of interests of sub-national entities in 
conditions of bicameralism is achieved, as a rule, with a fairly compact nature 
of the upper chamber. In Europe, the United Kingdom is the only country with 
the Senate that is larger—even much larger—than the Lower House. The Upper 
House had, and still does have, an unusually large number of members, although 
their number was cut from about 1200 in 1999 to about 780. Outside Europe, 
only Kazakhstan and Burkina Faso had until recently a senate that was larger 
than their lower house, but Kazakhstan’s has since been cut to 47 members 
(compared with 115 in the lower house) and Burkina Faso abolished its senate, 
but then decided to reinstate it in 2013, this time consisting of 89 members 
(the lower house has 127) (Drexhage, 2015). This is a serious argument in the 
dispute with those who may see a threat of “swelling” of the deputy corps in the 
second chamber.
“The composition and powers of senates,’ M. Wasowicz (1992) notes, “display 
a very great variety. They more often appear to be the result of historic 
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compromises”. However, as a result of any such compromise, the appearance 
of the second chamber of the parliament naturally leads to a redistribution of 
power at the highest level of the state organization, to a significant change in 
the composition of public authority in the country. Even S. Ganghof suggests 
to consider bicameralism in general as a form of legislative organization, but as 
a special form of government—a kind of hybrid between parliamentarism and 
presidency (see Ganghof, 2014).
The formation of the second chamber as an agency of regional (territorial) 
representation makes it possible to remove a considerable amount of the state 
affairs from the bureaucracy and transfer it to the local elites. Thus, there will be 
a “horizontal” decentralization of the state (legislative) power. At the same time, 
the lower chamber will have to act as a deterrent, so that centrifugal tendencies 
can not break the unity and integrity of the state.
3.2 Bicameralism as the way to strengthen government stability
Regarding the importance of the upper chamber for the stability of the government, 
according to Jeremy Waldron (2012), another approach to the executive power 
is that it is the most important difference that can be established between the 
two chambers under the Westminster system. It is unlikely that this feature can 
be considered as the most significant for characterizing the differences between 
the chambers of the parliament under any form of government, but its role in 
any case should be admitted as deserving special attention.
Waldron (2012) notes the weakness of the lower chamber in relations with the 
government, explaining this by the requirements of party discipline and the 
desire of MPs to get a ministerial portfolio sooner or later. In our opinion, this 
approach is somewhat simplistic, but on the whole, the government’s significant 
influence on the work of the lower chamber can not be denied. Under these 
circumstances, the upper chamber can indeed serve as an important element in 
the separation of powers in terms of ensuring the sovereignty and independence 
of the parliament as an agency of legislative power in relations with the 
government. This is particularly evident in case of a discrepancy between the 
party majority in the upper and lower chambers.
In the case of Ukraine and other countries of transit democracy, the reverse 
side of this problem is also important. The fact is that in the countries which 
are mixed, semi-presidential republics by the form of the government, where 
the government is traditionally under the significant influence of the head of 
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undeveloped, it is important to ensure independence of the government from the 
parliament rather than vice versa. Also, the presence of the upper chamber can 
help in resolving this issue.
We can not allow the fate of the government depend on the will of the 
parliamentary majority which is not structured in a party sense (and hence, in 
fact, not bearing political responsibility to voters) and is extremely inconstant.
The experience of Ukraine is quite eloquent in this respect. During its 26 
years of independence, 16 governments have been replaced in Ukraine (not 
including temporary acting duties), that is, the average “life expectancy” of 
a Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine is about one and a half years. Let us recall 
that during the same period of time, Ukraine has had only five presidents and 
seven convocations of the Verkhovna Rada, and notably some MPs managed 
to change their party and factional membership several times during one 
convocation. Simple mathematical actions allow us to conclude that during a 
presidential term, the composition of the government changed on average three 
times, and more than twice during one convocation of the Verkhovna Rada. 
Government leapfrog is a thing that always adversely affects both the state of 
the economy and the development of society and the state on the whole. In this 
regard, the attempts of government experts and political scholars to find ways to 
consolidate the positions of the government while preserving its responsibility 
under the parliament, as well as to increase its stability facing the challenges 
of the negative political situation in the country, are quite justified. And in this 
context, the presence of the second (upper) chamber is at the right time.
Even A. Esmein noted that the bicameral structure of parliaments is an important 
means of ensuring the balance of power branches, allowing the government 
to rely on one of the chambers in case of a conflict with another one (Esmein, 
1896). Unfortunately, until recently there were practically no works focused 
on studying the influence of bicameralism on the coalition policy and the 
fate of the coalition government. To a large extent this is due to the fact that 
the government’s “survival” almost never depends on the official decision 
of the upper chamber. However, studies conducted in the late 20th and early 
21st century convincingly demonstrated that bicameralism certainly affected 
the content and direction of the state policy (e.g., Hammond & Miller, 1987; 
Tsebelis & Money, 1997; Heller, 2001). After all, if the upper chamber has 
sufficient substantial powers in the legislative sphere, the government, striving 
to incorporate its policy into law, is forced to seek support in both chambers, 
regardless of the political forces in each of them.
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Recent studies, primarily the work of A. Lijphart (1984; 1999), P. Warwick 
(1992; 1994), and especially J. Druckman and M. Thies (2002), convincingly 
prove that the effectiveness, and eventually the duration of the “life cycle” of 
the government in conditions of bicameralism, depends not only on the lower, 
but to a great extent on the upper chamber. In particular, based on the data 
on more than 200 governments in 10 countries of the world, Druckmann and 
Thies (2002), as it were, “with figures in their hands”, demonstrate that the 
risk of early termination of the government with the support of the majority in 
the upper chamber of the parliament, is reduced by 56.4%, compared to when 
the government does not have such a support (see Druckman & Thies, 2002, 
p. 624). It follows that the government responsible to the parliament (lower 
chamber), wishing to consolidate its political positions and thereby prolong its 
stay in power, can not ignore the wider institutional context of bicameralism. For 
Ukraine, this conclusion means that the transition to the bicameral parliament 
can serve as an additional mechanism in the system of separation of powers, and 
as an important factor in ensuring the independence of the legislative power and 
the stability of the government.
Talking of bicameralism in the aspect of the relationship between the parliament 
and the government, it should be noted that the government in the semi-
presidential republics, to which Ukraine belongs, is traditionally under the 
strong influence of the head of the state (this even gives grounds to some authors 
to talk about the “bicephalism” of the executive power). As a result, this leads to 
the fact that the president and the government, in fact violating the constitutional 
balance between the highest state authorities, often act as a “united front” in 
relationship with the parliament. It is extremely difficult for a single-chamber 
parliament to withstand such a double pressure, whereas the existence of the 
second chamber in this case makes it possible to balance forces at the top, 
political level of the state organization and thus, to guarantee the integrity of 
the state power and the unity of state policy, as well as to demonstrate the real 
power of people’s representation.
It should be borne in mind that the upper chamber can not be dissolved by 
the head of the state, which increases the stability of the entire parliament and 
its independence in relations with the head of the state. Moreover, taking into 
account the potential impeachment to the president, in the procedure of which 
the two chambers of the parliament are involved, the head of the state is forced 
to reckon with the opinion of not only the lower chamber, which in the urgent 
case can be dissolved, but also the upper chamber, the fate of which he has 
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4. conclusions
Summarizing our arguments about the benefits of bicameralism, we can 
formulate the following conclusions:
Doubts about the benefits of bicameralism, expressed in modern literature, are 
primarily of a probabilistic nature and are built on its subjective perception. 
With a more careful and objective examination, it is found out that bicameralism 
in its political and legal nature is neither an attribute of federalism nor a catalyst 
for separatist tendencies. It is rather on the contrary, with a rational, balanced 
approach to resolving issues about the procedure of formation, size and 
competence of the upper chamber, bicameralism serves to strengthen statehood 
and the balance of the state apparatus at the highest political level, eliminates 
the basis for separatism and, on the whole strengthens the role of the parliament 
in the life of society and the state. 
The implementation of the second chamber of the parliament into the 
constitutional design of Ukraine will fully correspond to the mainstream of the 
modern parliamentary reforms that have covered almost all regions of the world. 
It should be especially noted that this attitude of the Ukrainian political elite to 
the problem of bicameralism will attest to adherence to the newest tendencies of 
“bicameral Europe”, which is extremely important in the context of Ukraine’s 
European integration aspirations.
Bicameralism is able to increase the responsibility and quality of law-making 
and, possibly, even lead to overcoming political corruption in the parliament. 
One of the most important positive qualities of the upper chambers is their 
significant role in ensuring the diversification of the state power and the stability 
of the government. At the same time, these advantages of bicameralism largely 
depend on the degree of perfection of the constitutional design and institutional 
representation.
For Ukraine, as well as for other states at the stage of democratic transition, 
bicameralism should be used as a tool to ensure the balance of power at the 
highest political level of the state organization, as an arena for coordinating state 
and local interests, and the institutional guarantee of society against the threat 
of authoritarian revenge.
The issue of the transition to the bicameral structure of the Verkhovna Rada of 
Ukraine, because of its importance, should be returned to the orbit of scientific 
and political discussions held within the framework of the constitutional reform. 
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This could be done through the creation of the fourth working group within the 
framework of the Constitutional Commission, focused on the implementation 
of parliamentary reform. As a result, a broad scientific discussion on the 
bicameralism problems should reach the level of concrete propositions for 
amending the text of the current Basic Law, which could become the object of 
discussion in the Constitutional Commission, and in the future—part of the bill 
on amending the Constitution of Ukraine in the aspect of parliamentary reform.
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